Douglas Barrie/LONDON
What do politicians do when they finish one defence review? They start another one. The UK's armed forces are now bracing themselves for the outcome of what is effectively the third review to be carried out since the beginning of the 1990s.
The rhetoric of the recently elected Labour Government's Strategic Defence Review (SDR), however, attempts to differentiate the review from the previous government's Options for Change and Front Line First studies. It sets out to examine defence requirements from first principles.
George Robertson, the Secretary of State for Defence, unlike his Conservative predecessors, has the relative political luxury of admitting that the UK's armed forces, including the Royal Air Force, "-are in many areas suffering from severe overstretch".
Roberston says:"The question the Review must now address is how recent changes in the international arena, and likely developments in the next 15 to 20 years, determine that we should modernise our force structures and capabilities. "
It is evident that the SDR is of paramount importance to the RAF - as it is to the other two arms of the military. It will define the conceptual environment which will frame its operational doctrine - and it will also draw the boundaries within which future budgetary battles will be fought.
If there is anything that can be taken for granted about the SDR it is that it will not result in any additional funding for the armed forces.
What remains a matter for much conjecture, at least for the moment, is whether the SDR will result in further significant cuts, both in terms of budgetary expenditure and of force structure.
Given the "first principles" tenor of the review, it is hardly surprising that rumours abound about a wide variety of potential procurement cuts and force restructuring options. The scope for speculation remains enormous, with sug- gestions ranging from mere tinkering, to the unthinkable - one national newspaper has repeatedly suggested that the independence of the RAF is under threat.
"It's rather like being flogged with a warm lettuce leaf," is the reaction of one senior RAF officer, dismissing claims of the service's imminent demise. While the winding up of the junior service is by far the most outlandish piece of speculation to be provoked by the SDR - the potential impact of the review on the RAF cannot be so lightly dismissed.
The RAF is in a transitory phase, attempting to adjust to the serious cuts which emerged from the Options For Change and Defence Cost Studies reviews. In terms of its combat-aircraft fleet, the service has seen a drop well in excess of 30% in numbers since 1990, while personnel figures have fallen from close to 80,000 in 1993 to 53,000 by late 1997.
The most welcome outcome of the SDR to the RAF would be if it merely prolongs this existing transition period, as the service accommodates additional change. At worst it may send service morale plunging to the depths it plumbed during the implementation of the Options for Change cuts.
The SDR also provides the opportunity for a more equal match between resources and requirements. The previous reviews have made substantial cuts to both personnel and hardware, while still tasking the armed forces with the same roles. It is this which has resulted in what Robertson recognises as "overstretch".
At the official launch of the SDR in May, senior Government officials privately stressed that certain key procurement projects would effectively be ring fenced, including the Eurofighter EF2000.
What is still up for debate is a host of other possible procurements which will shape both the type and size of the inventory of the RAF for the first few decades of the next century.
The "monolithic threat" posed by the Soviet Union provided the Cold War with several touchstones which defence planners could rely upon. The UK's armed forces were structured to fight in known theatres - with RAF operations focused in central Europe. This certainty has since gone, replaced by a multi-polar environment where the UK's armed forces have to operate globally.
Robertson has, on more than one occasion, suggested that the "-better deployability and sustainability needed by our forces" will be a feature of the SDR.
The UK Ministry of Defence has been evaluating its future transport requirements, running several studies examining the type of airlift necessary to support the Joint Rapid Deployment Force (JRDF). The SDR could determine both the timescale and the general nature of the procurements which will provide the RAF's future tactical and, possibly, strategic airlift capabilities.
Senior RAF officers are in little doubt that there is a genuine need for an aircraft with a considerably greater lift capability than the Lockheed Martin C-130J Hercules II, already on order. There is also solid support for the RAF gaining the ability to operate an aircraft in the class of the European Future Large Aircraft or the larger Boeing C-17 Globemaster III, and it remains conceivable that the SDR could provide the green light for such a project.
While either may eventually find its way into the RAF inventory, it is unlikely that the MoD would follow a traditional procurement path. Instead some form of Private Finance Initiative, bringing in private investment, is the preferred method of acquisition.
The SDR will effectively inform what the RAF hopes will be a "coherent fleet plot" covering its overall transport and tanker aircraft requirements. This will also probably address replacements for the BAC VC10 and Lockheed L-1011 TriStar tanker/transport fleets.
The retirement dates for the types remain a moveable feast, with the RAF looking at offers from both Airbus Industrie and Boeing. Seattle has pitched in with a tanker/transport Boeing 767, with Toulouse offering an Airbus A310-200 derivative. The future service length of the VC10 is likely to be determined by considerable cost-investment analysis.
This could yet see the aircraft withdrawn from service in the first few years of the next century, much earlier than the RAF's previous planning date.
Another programme which is being scrutinised under the SDR, and will inevitably be shaped in part by the outcome of the review, is the Future Offensive Air System, the planned replacement for the Panavia Tornado GR4. The planning number for the GR4 upgrade being carried out by British Aerospace is 142 aircraft, and industry officials believe that this will remain the case following the conclusion of the SDR.
The fundamental requirements for the Tornado design - the ability to penetrate heavily defended airspace to deliver a free-fall nuclear weapon - were frozen by the Cold War. The SDR will set out the new Government's view on what Roberston describes as "the new strategic realities" - the framework within which the GR4's successor will be defined.
This assumes that a GR4 successor will continue to be sought following the outcome of the SDR.
While suggestions that the SDR is being used to consider carving up the RAF between the Army and the Navy appear risible - the possibility of some presently independent service elements being drawn together carries greater credibility.
One area which has been viewed in some quarters as offering ample scope for some form of consolidation is in the British Army and RAF's helicopter operations. In the past, attempts to examine bringing together the respective services' helicopter operations have quickly become bogged down in ownership issues.
The ever-increasing emphasis on joint operations suggests that some form of dual-service defence-helicopter-force grouping is certain to be part of any SDR agenda for consideration. Moving the focus of any discussion away from ownership and towards operational concerns could prove more fruitful. A joint helicopter unit - built along on the lines established by the tri-service Defence Helicopter Flying Training School - would be particularly appropriate given that the Army Air Corps (AAC) will start to receive the first of its 67 GKN Westland WAH-64 Longbow Apache attack helicopters by the end of 2000.
The WAH-64 will mark a step change in capability for the AAC in terms of an offensive air capability in comparison to its Westland Lynx AH7 used in the anti-tank role. The Army also appears to be bargaining its almost certain reduction in tank numbers with a bid to gain additional WAH-64s.
Another multi-service effort which has been scrutinised within the SDR is the Airborne Stand-off Radar (ASTOR) programme. The project is now a tri-service effort, intended to provide its users with near-real-time radar imagery at ranges of more than 200km (110nm).
If there is any one project which encapsulates the new Government's position on defence, it is the ASTOR programme, which is well suited to roles across the requirements spectrum, from high-intensity conflict to crisis management.
Other elements of the RAF's procurement programme are also like to be being reviewed, including three weapons projects:the Matra BAe Dynamics Storm Shadow stand-off missile, the Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile (BVRAAM) project, and the GEC-Marconi Brimstone anti-armour weapon.
Perhaps the most vulnerable of the three is the Brimstone, should the SDRpursue procurement cuts. Although a multi-role air-to-surface missile, its primary role remains as an anti-tank weapon.
The RAF has suffered two rounds of reviews so far in the past decade, but the SDR, due by the year end, may be the last it has to undergo for some time.
By laying out the framework within which the armed forces will operate beyond the first two decades of the next century, the new review should finally have set out a long-term vision at which the force can aim.
Source: Flight International
